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Hard cases of comparison
Michael Messerli and Kevin Reuter
*
In hard cases of comparison, people are faced with two options neither of
which is conceived of as better, worse, or equally good compared to the other.
Most philosophers claim that hard cases (i) can indeed be distinguished from
cases in which two options are equally good, and (ii) can be characterized
by a failure of transitive reasoning. It is a much more controversial matter
and at the heart of an ongoing debate, whether the options in hard cases
of comparison should be interpreted as incomparable, on par, or roughly
equal. So far, however, none of these claims and interpretations have been
tested. This paper presents the first empirical investigation on hard cases,
intransitive reasoning, and incomparability. Our results reveal that hard
cases present real-world dilemmas in which a significant majority of people
violate transitivity. After suggesting a way of operationalizing the notion
of incomparability, we provide empirical evidence that the options in some
hard cases are not considered to be incomparable. Theories of rough equality
or parity seem to provide better interpretations of our results.
Keywords: Hard Cases; Incomparability; Small-Improvement Argument; Tran-
sitivity; Intransitivity; Operationalization; Empirical Studies.
1 Introduction
Rational decision making can be difficult. Imagine you are confronted with a
choice between having a successful career as a lawyer and having a successful
career as an artist.1 While some people would surely have a clear preference
for becoming either a lawyer or an artist, others might find this choice hard:
having a successful career as a lawyer will be judged to be neither better
than, nor worse than, nor equal to having a successful career as an artist.
∗The authors’ names are listed in alphabetic order. This work is fully collabo-
rative. Please address any correspondence to michael.messerli@philo.unibe.ch and ke-
vin.reuter@philo.unibe.ch
1This is a modified version of an example found in Raz (1986, p. 342).
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It also does not seem appropriate to solve the conflict on the basis of some
randomizing procedure.2 This leads to the worrying conclusion that in such
hard cases, it is not possible to decide rationally between the alternatives.
To substantiate this claim, let us consider the following argument:
i. The possibility of rational choice between two options depends on them
being comparable.
ii. Two options, x and y, are comparable, if and only if x is either better
than, worse than, or equal to y.
iii. There are hard cases, in which x is neither better, nor worse, nor
equally good to y.
∴ There are hard cases, in which a rational decision cannot be made.
The argument is prima facie compelling: How can you decide rationally
between a career as a lawyer and a career as an artist if a comparison cannot
be made? How can you compare these options if one option is neither better
than, nor worse than, nor equally good to another option? In this paper we
focus on the second and the third premise: How shall we understand the
phenomenon of a hard case? What is characteristic for it?
Some philosophers deny or are at least suspicious about the existence of
hard cases. E.g. Regan (1997) endorses the thesis of strong comparability –
the thesis that there is always a ranking of two options in terms of a common
value. He writes: ”(...) I am inclined to take comparability as my working
hypothesis.” (1997, p. 150). However, a majority of philosophers accept that
hard cases of comparison exist. Chang (2002a, p. 671) and Boot (2007, p. 30),
for instance, claim that we sometimes promote judgments that one option
is neither better than, nor worse than, nor equally good to another option.
Not only is it part of the philosophical consensus that hard cases exist,
it is generally accepted that such cases can be shown to violate transitivi-
ty. In order to show how transitivity fails in hard cases of comparison, we
will consider the small-improvement argument. The small-improvement ar-
gument is based upon the intuitive idea that in hard cases an option which
is marginally improved (x+) is always better than the original option (x)
but not better than the alternative option (y).3 It can be easily illustrated
2In contrast, tossing a coin seems to be a reasonable strategy if the options are equally
good. For a discussion on using a random process in hard case scenarios, see Schaber
(1994, p. 158) and Chang (2002a, p. 684-685; 2012, p. 118). Reuter & Messerli (ms) are
in the process of investigating this issue empirically.
3The argument is discussed in, e.g. De Sousa (1974), Raz (1986), Chang (2002a), Es-
pinoza (2008), Boot (2009), Carlson (2011), Gustafsson (2013) and Andreou (2015).
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with the example used above:
1. A career as a lawyer (x) is neither better nor worse than a career as
an artist (y).
2. A career as a lawyer plus two additional holidays (x+) is neither better
nor worse than a career as an artist (y).
3. A career as a lawyer plus two additional holidays (x+) is better than
a career as a lawyer (x).
∴ A career as a lawyer is neither better than nor worse than nor equal
to a career as an artist.
Anyone who endorses statements (1) - (3) reasons intransitively, because
if transitivity were to hold, we could infer the negation of (3) from both
(1) and (2). The small-improvement argument is, therefore, standardly con-
sidered to reveal a failure of transitivity (Boot 2007, p. 32). We can fur-
thermore conclude from the three premises that in hard cases one option
is neither better, nor worse, nor equal to another option – see section 2.2.
for a more detailed analysis of transitivity and the conclusion of the small-
improvement argument. This conclusion is most commonly interpreted to
show that in hard cases two options are incomparable. However, others have
resisted such an interpretation of the small-improvement argument and in-
stead suggested to conceive of options in hard cases as roughly comparable
(Parfit 1986) or on par (Chang 2002a). While we agree that hard cases of
comparison are particularly fascinating cases that raise important questions
about violations of transitivity, the possibility of incomparability, as well as
rationality, the existing literature is devoid of any empirical data that pro-
vides a foundation for the purely a priori discussions in the literature. More
specifically, the debate has failed to address three important questions:
a. Are hard cases real-world dilemmas, i.e. do we really distinguish hard
cases from easy cases of comparison?
b. Do people indeed violate transitivity in hard cases?
c. Can we operationalize the notion of incomparability and provide em-
pirical evidence for or against that notion?
In order to answer these three questions, we will proceed as follows:
Section 2 illustrates the various aspects of the small-improvement argument.
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Most importantly, we will discuss how to distinguish easy from hard cases,
and how hard cases lead to a failure of transitive reasoning. We also propose
a way to operationalize the notion of incomparability. In Section 3 – the
empirical part of this paper – we examine the empirical reality of hard
cases, failure of transitivity, and incomparability. In order to investigate
the a priori claims made by philosophers, we presented participants with
both easy and hard case scenarios. People’s responses were then recorded to
examine the response profiles in easy and hard cases of comparison. Section
4 concludes with a General Discussion combining the theoretical and the
empirical part. In Appendix 1 we analyze the role of (in)transitivity within
the small-improvement argument. Appendix 2 presents the vignettes of the
empirical study.
2 The Small-Improvement Argument
and its Interpretations
2.1 The Ingredients: Hard Cases of Comparison
We have introduced the small-improvement argument in the previous secti-
on. Let us now consider a general version of this argument:
1. x is neither better nor worse than y.
2. x+ is neither better nor worse than y.
3. x+ is better than x.
∴ x is neither better than nor worse than nor equal to y.
In hard cases of comparison the first two premises seem to be true, e.g.
lawyer vs. artist. However, in easy cases of comparison the second premise
does not hold. So-called easy cases of comparison are not situations in which
it is easy to decide between two options. Instead, the options are likely to
be considered equally good such that a small incentive will persuade the
agent to choose the option that includes the small incentive (x+). E.g.,
imagine you have the choice between a career at two equally appealing law
firms. While a career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners (x) is neither better
nor worse than a career as a lawyer at Jones & Partners (y), a career as
a lawyer at Smith & Partners plus two additional holidays (x+) is ceteris
paribus better than a career as a lawyer at Jones & Partners (y).
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Thus, we can see that the question of whether hard cases reveal a failure
of transitivity does not need to be raised in order to differentiate easy from
hard cases: different responses to the first two premises are sufficient to dis-
tinguish both kinds of choices. Not all philosophers do agree that hard cases
differ from easy cases. Regan (1997) suggests that in all cases of compari-
son, either one option is better than the other or they are precisely equal
in value (1997, p. 129). He will therefore reject the distinction between an
easy and a hard case. Who is right, Regan or the philosophical consensus?
The empirical studies we present in (3.1) were designed to address this issue.
We will see that there is very little empirical support for Regan’s position.
Instead, the philosophical consensus seems to be largely confirmed.
2.2 The Mark of Hard Cases: Failure of Transitivity
Whereas the first two premises of the small-improvement argument are suffi-
cient to separate easy from hard cases, most philosophers have focused on a
fascinating consequence of hard cases. In addition to the first two premises,
any person who is willing to endorse premise (3) of the small-improvement
argument, shows a failure of transitive reasoning.4
To recognize the role of intransitivity within the small-improvement ar-
gument, let us first formalize each premise of the argument:
1 ¬(x ≻ y) ∧¬(y ≻ x) premise
2 ¬(x+ ≻ y) ∧¬(y ≻ x+) premise
3 x+ ≻ x premise
’x’, ’y’ and ’x+’ represent the options that the agent is confronted with.
’≻’ means ’is better than’. ’≺’ means ’is worse than’. ’=’ means ’equal in
value to’. ’¬’ stands for a negation. ’¬(x ≻ y) ’ for instance, says that it is
not true that x is better than y.
In the formalization above it can be seen that the small-improvement
argument violates the following kind of transitivity:
(x+ ≻ x ∧ ¬(y ≻ x))→ x+ ≻ y
4Raz states: ”The test of incommensurability is failure of transitivity.”(Raz 1986, p.
325). Hsieh (2005, p. 201) and Boot (2007, p. 32) are following Raz by claiming that
failure of transitivity is characteristic for incomparability. Chang, recently interviewed,
says that an important difference between equally good and on a par is that equally good
is transitive, while on a par is not (Chang: ’The existentialist of hard choices’). For Parfit
(1986), rough equality is the same as a non-transitive value relation (1986, p. 431).
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The conjunction of the three premises cannot be true, if the transitivity
condition above is not violated.5
Intransitivity is therefore widely accepted as the mark of hard cases. Ho-
wever, no empirical evidence has been put forward to underline this claim.
In (3.2) we show that a substantial majority of people indeed violate tran-
sitivity in hard cases.
2.3 The Interpretation: Incomparability or
Rough Comparability
The small-improvement argument contains two premises (1) and (2) which
allow us distinguish hard from easy cases. In conjunction with premise (3),
we observe that violations of transitivity seem to be an unavoidable conse-
quence of hard cases. In the last stage, we now need to consider the conclu-
sion of the small-improvement argument. Recall that if x is neither better
nor worse than y, and x+ neither better nor worse than y, and x+ better
than x, then we can conclude that
∴ x is neither better than nor worse than nor equal to y
But what does it mean for one option to be neither better than, nor worse
than, nor equally good to another option? Many scholars have argued that
the conclusion of the small-improvement argument means that both options
are incomparable (De Sousa 1974, p. 546, Raz 1986, p. 322, Anderson 1997,
p. 90, Constantinescu 2012, p. 58). However, there are some philosophers,
who do not accept this view. Referring to Chang (2002a) and Gert (2004),
Andreou writes: ”I am sympathetic with their skepticism about the common
assumption that if it is not the case that an option is determinately better
than, worse than or equal to another option, then this is necessarily a case
of incomparability.” (2011, p. 62). According to Chang, ”Two items are in-
comparable if no positive value relation holds between them.” (Chang: 1997,
5It should be emphasized that the transitvity condition violated in these cases is not
of the well known form such as x is better than y, y is better than z, and x is better than
z. Instead, it is logically equivalent with following negative transitivity principle:
¬(x+ ≻ y) ∧ ¬(y ≻ x))→ ¬(x+ ≻ x)
For example, Bridges & Mehta discuss negative transitivity of the ’better than’ relation
(Bridges & Mehta 2013). We would like to stress that the role of (in)transitivity within the
small-improvement argument is more complex. In Appendix 1 we show two possibilities
on how to move from the premises to the conclusion. These formalizations show that some
versions of the small-improvement argument imply a different form of transitivity while
others do not.
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p. 4). In other words, if no value can be found that allows for comparison,
items in hard cases remain incomparable. However, Chang herself has pro-
vided an alternative account, rejecting the idea that no other relation but
’better than’, ’worse than’ and ’equally good to’ holds between two items in
hard cases. She has argued that two options in hard cases are not incompa-
rable but rather on par with each other, whereby she describes the notion
of parity as a nonzero, unbiased difference. (Chang 2002b, p. 168, Chang
1997, p. 26).6 Griffin and Parfit have used similar strategies. According to
Griffin and Parfit, hard cases should be interpreted as rough comparability
(Griffin 1986, p. 96, Parfit 1986, p. 431). They suggest that two items in
hard cases are merely in the same league or roughly equal (Parfit 1986, p.
431): If two items are in the same league or roughly equal, then a lack of
clarity regarding the items at stake prevents a more precise determination
of their relation.
D’Agostino (2003) makes a different suggestion. He maintains that hard
cases are incommensurable, whereby this means that a trade-off is not pos-
sible.7 In standard cases of comparison, agents will trade a certain number
of items x (e.g. 5 bananas) for a certain number of items y, e.g. 3 apples.
Thus, the substitution rate would be 5/3. In cases of incommensurability,
so D’Agostino, no such substitution rate exists – the possibility of a substi-
tution rate is crucial for items to be comparable.
While the explication of these notions – incomparability, incommensura-
bility, parity, rough equality – is complex, we can group these various theories
into two camps – thereby obviously eliminating both important and subt-
le distinctions of the accounts at stake: those theories that maintain that
in hard cases options are still roughly comparable (Chang8, Griffin, Parfit,
Andreou); and those theories that pertain that such a comparison cannot
be made (Raz, D’Agostino), i.e. that both options are incomparable.
For the purposes of this paper, let us distinguish between strict incompa-
rability and rough comparability.9 Whereas strict incomparability maintains
6Several philosophers explicate this concept in different ways. See for instance, Gert
(2004), Rabinowicz (2008) and Andreou (2015).
7D’Agostino distinguishes different kinds of incommensurability. We are referring here
to the idea, which D’Agostino calls S-Incommensurability (D’Agostino 2003, p. 43)
8There are important differences between the notions of parity (Chang 2002) and rough
equality (Griffin 1997, Parfit 1986). However, as an antipode to strict incomparability, we
believe that Chang’s, Griffin’s and Parfit’s theories have more in common than what
separates them. For the purposes of this paper, we will therefore treat them under the
single heading of theories of rough comparability.
9Note that both concepts do not contradict the conclusion of the small-improvement
argument.
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that no comparison can be made between options in hard cases, rough com-
parability holds that a comparison is in principle possible. But how can we
decide which of these two positions is correct? In other words, can we ope-
rationalize strict incomparability in such a way that we can decide whether
two options in hard cases are strictly incomparable or roughly comparable?
We believe that such an operationalization is not only possible but, in what
follows, we will identify such a mechanism and present an experiment in
(3.3) in which we recorded data that supports one of the interpretations of
the small-improvement argument.
The key to operationalizing the phenomenon of strict incomparability
is to consider the incentive that is a crucial part in the small-improvement
argument. If strict incomparability is true, then no incentive – or value –
should exist that makes both options comparable. Applied to our example at
hand, no matter how many holidays are added to one option, a career as an
artist continues to be (at least to many) neither better nor worse nor equal
to a career as a lawyer. In contrast, proponents of the thesis of rough com-
parability tend to think that if the incentive is appropriate and sufficiently
large, people will choose one option over the other, demonstrating that peo-
ple were comparing both options the whole time. After all, if two options
are merely roughly equal, then a nice incentive will make them unequal. A
first attempt to adjudicate between both interpretations seems therefore to
offer a related and sufficiently high incentive and observe whether people
can be convinced to choose either of the two options. However, this will not
work. A decision between a career as an artist and a lawyer may be both
incomparable but also relatively insignificant when comparing 30 additional
holidays with no holidays at all. In such a case, people might make a deci-
sion in favour ot the improved option only because they would like to get
the incentive. Thus, neither interpretation can be ruled out by showing that
most people decide in favor of x+ given a large-enough incentive.
Let us therefore go one step further: It makes sense to assume that peo-
ple have different levels of incentive-thresholds when making a decision in
favor of one option, e.g. whereas Steve will decide in favor of a career as a
lawyer when two additional holidays are added, Sandra might have to be
offered six additional holidays in order to choose a law career. However,
these differential responses can also be explained by both interpretations of
the small-improvement argument: The strict incomparability theorist will
account for these responses by claiming that different people will not attach
the same importance to additional holidays. Although both options are in-
comparable, Steve is convinced by two additional holidays because holidays
mean quite a lot to him. Sandra is not so fond of holidays and thus needs
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to be offered a greater number of holidays in order to be persuaded. In con-
trast, the rough comparability theorist will explain the differential responses
in a different way: The difference between Steve’s and Sandra’s response is
not so much a matter of the importance of being on holidays but it is rather
the case that the roughness of the comparability can be larger or smaller.
For Steve, the two careers are just about roughly equal. A small incentive is
already sufficient to persuade him to choose a career as a lawyer. For San-
dra, the comparison between both careers allows for less precision: a larger
incentive needs to be offered to her such that she perceives the law career
to be more valuable.10
If what we discussed in the last paragraph is true, then there is a way to
operationalize the phenomenon of strict incomparability. We have claimed
that differing responses regarding the perceived thresholds of the incentive in
a hard case must be accounted for by the proponent of strict incomparability
in a very determinate manner. More specifically, the following hypothesis can
be made:
Strict Incomparability The threshold value of the incentive in hard ca-
ses is negatively correlated with the perceived importance of the incentive.
This operationalization of strict incomparability reflects the need to ex-
plain positive decisions in hard cases as decisions in favor of the incentive and
not as decisions in favor of one of the original options. If a person attaches
great importance to the incentive type (holidays), then a lower magnitude
of the incentive (e.g. number of additional holidays) is required to pass the
threshold – hence the negative correlation. Proponents of rough comparabi-
lity, in contrast, will not predict such a negative correlation. The perceived
importance of the incentive will determine the value of the roughness only
minimally, if at all. Thus, once we know how the perceived importance of the
incentive is related to the threshold value of the incentive, we can determine
whether strict incomparability or rough comparability provide better inter-
pretations of the conclusion of the small-improvement argument. Crucially,
this operationalization can be empirically tested. Before we do so, however,
we first need to investigate whether hard cases exist at all.
10We do not claim that the roughness of hard cases is necessarily independent of the
incentive offered. It is likely, however, that this roughness is determined by several factors
of which the incentive is only one possible factor.
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3 Empirical Part
We have discussed several scholars who argue that hard cases, in contrast to
other cases of comparison, exist and reveal a failure of transitive reasoning.
Not everybody has been so optimistic about the existence of hard cases
though. Regan (1997) not only believes that comparisons might be possible
in all cases, he also emphasizes that ”nothing is obvious in this area” (1997,
p. 150, our italics). If he is right – and we completely agree with Regan on
the latter point – then the most straightforward way to settle this question is
to make sure the debate has a solid empirical foundation. More specifically,
we think that the intuitive plausibility of many of the claims made in this
discussion need to be backed up by empirical data. In our empirical studies,
we will focus on three claims in this debate where philosophers largely rely
on the intuitive plausibility of exemplary cases:
3.1 hard cases can be distinguished from easy cases,
3.2 failure of transitive reasoning is characteristic for hard cases,
3.3 options in hard cases are incomparable / roughly equal / on par.
In order to investigate claims (3.1) & (3.2) empirically, we tested people’s
responses to both easy and hard cases. For (3.3.), we focused on a modified
hard case of comparison.
Methods
All participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid
a small fee for their participation. In order to examine (3.1.) and (3.2.), we
conducted two studies. In both studies, participants were randomly assigned
to a hard case or to an easy case of comparison.
Study 1:
• Hard Case: career as a lawyer or career as an artist (N=99)
• Easy Case: career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners or career as a lawyer
at Jones & Partners (N=97)
Study 2:
• Hard Case: going out with friends or doing sports (N=105)
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• Easy Case: working out at Orange fitness-club or working out at Yellow
fitness-club (N=104)
In all four cases, the subjects were presented with three vignettes and
subsequently asked to evaluate the situations they were confronted with.11
As an example, here are the three vignettes that we presented in the hard ca-
se of Study 1. All other vignettes were equivalent in structure (see Appendix
2 for the exact wording of the vignettes).
First Vignette
Imagine you have got the choice between a successful career as a lawyer
and a successful career as an artist. How would you evaluate your situation?
a. A career as a lawyer is better than a career as an artist.
b. A career as a lawyer is worse than a career as an artist.
c. A career as a lawyer is neither better nor worse than a career as
an artist.
Second Vignette
Now imagine you have got the choice between a successful career as a
lawyer plus 2 additional holidays and a successful career as an artist. How
would you evaluate your situation?
a. A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is better than a career
as an artist.
11The vignettes asked the participants to imagine themselves being faced with the de-
cision at hand, and to evaluate which option they themselves would prefer. This was
important, for otherwise we cannot conclude that the option ’neither better nor worse’
indicates no preference for either of the two options. According to the Range of Permis-
sible Preference View, people might find ’neither better nor worse’ the best answer in
decision-making scenarios, because they believe it is permissible for a person to prefer x
over y just as it is permissible for a person to prefer y over x. The distinction between
preference and valuation has been very clearly made by Gert (for a related account based
on permissible preference orderings, see Rabinowicz (2008)): “(...)preference and valuation
are not the same things, and preference is most closely related to choice, while valuation
is more closely related to the assessment of choice.“ (2004, p. 493). In order to avoid that
people reason in terms of valuation or permissibility, we did not ask people to tell us which
preferences they found permissible. Rather, we requested of them to make a decision based
on their own preferences.
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b. A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is worse than a career
as an artist.
c. A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is neither better nor
worse than a career as an artist.
Third Vignette
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between a successful career
as a lawyer plus 2 additional holidays and a successful career as a lawyer
without 2 additional holidays. How would you evaluate your situation?
a. A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is better than a career
as a lawyer.
b. A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is worse than a career
as a lawyer.
c. A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is neither better nor
worse than a career as a lawyer.
3.1 Hard Cases vs. Easy Cases
In the previous section we have argued that the test bed for the distinc-
tion between hard and easy cases are the first two premises of the small-
improvement argument. In hard cases, a majority of people who endorse (1)
should also endorse (2):
1. x is neither better nor worse than y
2. x+ is neither better nor worse than y
In contrast, in an easy case, those participants who agree to (1) should
not endorse (2) but instead hold that ’x+ is better than y’.
Results
To assess the impact of easy vs. hard cases on people’s decisions, we ana-
lyzed whether the responses from all participants who chose ’neither better
nor worse’ in the first vignettes of Study 1 & 2, would show different re-
sponse profiles for easy and hard cases in the second vignettes. In Study 1,
only 9.8% (N=9) of the participants who selected ’neither better nor wor-
se’ in the first vignette of the easy choice condition, also selected ’neither
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better nor worse’ when a small incentive was added (additional holidays).
84.7% (N=78) of the participants chose a career at the law firm which also
provided two additional holidays. In contrast, in the hard case condition,
78.6% (N=33) of the participants who selected ’neither better nor worse’ in
the first vignette, also selected the response ’neither better nor worse’ when
a small incentive was added. Merely 21.4% (N=9) of the participants chose
a career as a lawyer over a career as an artist when two additional holidays
were offered. A Pearson’s Chi-Square Test revealed that the difference bet-
ween ratings in the easy vs. the hard case was highly significant: χ2=63.41, p
< 0.001, two-tailed. Similar results obtained in Study 2: 41 participants did
not prefer either the ’doing sports’ or the ’going out with friends’ option in
the hard case scenario. 60.0% of those subjects did not favor any of the two
options when a small incentive was added. In the easy case, a large majority
(77.4%) of the participants decided in favor of one fitness club once a small
incentive was presented. The difference between the easy and hard case con-
ditions was significant: χ2 =20.34, p < 0.01, two-tailed. The percentages of
the responses of both studies are also shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Responses to the second vignettes. On the left (in light grey): a majority of people in
easy cases prefer the option to which a small incentive is added. On the right (in dark grey): In
hard cases, most people opt for the ’neither better nor worse’ option despite the fact that an
incentive was added to the first option.
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Discussion
The results clearly show that people’s response patterns are different for
easy and hard cases of comparison. Easy cases are characterized by two see-
mingly equal options. Once an incentive is presented, a large majority favor
one option over the other – indicating that the original choice was between
equally good options. Hard cases do not show the same pattern of responses:
The majority of participants who favor neither option in the original scena-
rios (lawyer vs. artist and going out with friends vs. doing sports) are not
persuaded by an additional incentive, even if the incentive consists of two
additional holidays (respectively one dollar), demonstrating that the original
options were not considered to be equally good. Nonetheless, quite a large
number of people in hard cases did consider the improved option x+ to be
better than the alternative option (y). How can we explain this outcome?
First, it might well have been the case that other participants thought of
both careers as equally desirable. For those participants, the choice did not
present a hard case of comparison. Second, the two additional holidays that
we presented in the second vignettes might have been already too tempting
for those people who value holidays very much. They therefore decided in
favor of the improved option although the original case was indeed a hard
case of comparison. In section 3.3 we deal with this possibility in greater
detail.
The results show different response patterns for easy and hard cases of
comparison and in turn suggest that hard cases are real-world phenomena
that are different from easy cases of comparison. However, the epistemic
limitations view provides an alternative and hence competing explanation
of the results of the career choice experiment.12 Two possible versions of
this view can be distinguished. In a decision such as choosing between dif-
ferent careers, an agent is either faced with uncertainty about matters of
non-normative facts or with uncertainty about matters of normative facts.
The former case can be analyzed within the framework of decision theory.
Accordingly, an agent is faced with a decision under risk or a decision under
ignorance (see for instance Resnik 1990 or De Jonge 2012). Most choices are
made against a background of various states of affairs. Depending on what
states will come true, different outputs are realized and since the agent can
- if at all - only assign probabilities to these states, there is a high degree of
factual uncertainty, or as Jensen puts it: “Almost any decision one can think
of is taken in a context in which the decision maker has only limited infor-
12We thank a reviewer for this journal for suggestions regarding the epistemic limitations
view.
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mation.“ (Jensen 2011, p. 406). Now, observe that the hard case version of
the career scenario presumably has a relatively high degree of factual uncer-
tainty compared to the easy case version: it is harder to predict the possible
outcomes of pursuing a law or art career than predicting the outcome of
pursuing two law careers in New York. If this is correct then differences in
the responses between easy and hard cases might be due to the uncertainty
of matters of non-normative facts. However, the vignettes of Study 2 (going
out with friends vs. doing sports) do not contain the same asymmetry in
the degree of uncertainty between the easy and hard cases of comparison.
Most people know pretty well the possible outcomes of going out with fri-
ends and doing sports.13 Given that the response patterns did not differ
significantly between Study 1 & 2, the first version of the epistemic limita-
tions view seems not very suitable to provide an alternative explanation of
our results. The second version of the epistemic limitations view concerns
normative uncertainty about the outputs, i.e. uncertainty about one’s own
preferences (see e.g. Sepielli 2009). Accordingly, more people select ’neither
better nor worse’ in hard case scenarios not because people have no prefe-
rence for either option but because both options are too close to call, i.e.
the difference between one’s preferences for the two options is epistemically
opaque. However, while this account sounds convincing for a single choice,
it seems less reasonable when considering the small incentive option. In the
second vignettes, an incentive is added to one option. If there were indeed
a fine-grained epistemic limitation, it seems implausible that a majority of
the participants continue to fail to introspect their preferences when being
confronted with the second choice.
3.2 Failure of Transitivity
The results presented in (3.1) show that a distinction between easy and hard
cases is indeed well motivated and empirically supported. However, most
philosophers do not focus on distinguishing both cases of comparison, they
make specific claims about hard cases. Most importantly, they argue that
people violate transitvity. If failure of transitivity is indeed characteristic of
hard cases, we can predict that people who endorse (1) and (2) should also
endorse (3):
13Related to this, we follow Chang (2002, 2012) who argues against the epistemic limi-
tations view. Chang holds the position that in hard cases of comparison we often have
enough practical certainty to be sure that one option is neither better, nor worse, nor
equal to another option, i.e. that people know which factors matter for the decision.
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1. x is neither better nor worse than y,
2. x+ is neither better nor worse than y,
3. x+ is better than x.
Results
In order to investigate whether failure of transitive reasoning is cha-
racteristic for hard cases, we analyzed how many people actually violated
transitivity in both studies. In Study 1, of all those participants who respon-
ded with ’neither better nor worse’ to the first two vignettes, 60.6% (N=20)
indeed violated the transitivity requirement. This was, however, not signi-
ficantly above chance level, χ2 = 2.25, p = 0.134, two-tailed. In the easy
case condition, only a single person violated the transitivity requirement. In
Study 2, a greater number of participants failed the transitivity condition
(70.8%). This result was significantly above chance: χ2= 9.32, p = 0.002,
two-tailed. Four participants, i.e. 20% violated transitivity in the easy con-
dition of Study 2. The percentages in response to the third vignettes are
depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Participant’s responses to the third vignettes, assessing the claim that in hard cases
transitivity is violated. In both studies, a majority of the participants violated transitivity (light
bars on the left), whereas a smaller percentage did not fail the transitivity condition.
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Discussion
The analysis of people’s responses to the third vignettes brought to light
that a majority of the participants violated transitivity. While this outcome
was significant in Study 2, a substantial minority did not fail the transitivi-
ty requirement, especially in Study 1. Three explanations might be given to
account for this effect. First, some participants might have been aware that
a different response would have violated transitivity and hence decided to
opt for a less plausible but consistent (in the sense of transitivity) respon-
se. Second, having responded twice before (first and second vignette) with
’neither better nor worse’, some participants might have chosen the same
response either due to lack of attention or lack of motivation. Third, those
people who did not fail the transitivity condition, might have considered the
incentive as too small to be bothered to favor the option x+.14
3.3 Do we think of options in hard cases as incomparable?
We have seen that different philosophers argue for different interpretations
of the conclusion of the small-improvement argument. While some, e.g.,
Griffin (1997), Parfit (1986), Andreou (2011) interpret options in hard cases
of comparison as being roughly comparable, others (Raz 1986, D’Agostino
2003) believe that the options in hard cases are incomparable. In (2.3) we
have suggested a way to operationalize the notion of strict incomparability.
By relating the perceived importance of the incentive – that is added to
one of the options in hard cases – to the threshold value of the incentive, we
can determine whether or not any correlation exists between those variables.
Focusing on incomparability, the following hypothesis has been developed
in (2.3).
Strict Incomparability The threshold value of the incentive in hard ca-
ses is negatively correlated with the perceived importance of the incentive.
Methods
Artists tend to be less constrained in terms of holidays than lawyers.
In Study 3, we therefore decided to present participants (N=155) with a
variation of vignette 1 from Study 1. The only difference consisted in asking
participants to evaluate the situation between having a successful career as
a lawyer and a successful career as an architect. Those participants (N=71)
14In a follow-up study (Reuter & Messerli, ms) we investigate the impact of the import-
ance of a decision on violations of transitvity.
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who responded that a career as a lawyer was neither better nor worse than a
career as an architect, were then randomly assigned to one of the following
two conditions:
Condition 1: Becoming a lawyer (N=36)
You have decided that a successful career as a lawyer is neither better
nor worse than a successful career as an architect. How many additional
holidays would a law firm need to offer so that you would decide in favor of
a career as a lawyer compared to a career as an architect?
Condition 2: Becoming an architect (N=35)
You have decided that a successful career as a lawyer is neither better
nor worse than a successful career as an architect. How many additional
holidays would an architecture firm need to offer so that you would decide
in favor of a career as an architect compared to a career as a lawyer?
Participants answered on a scale from 0 additional holidays to 21 ad-
ditional holidays. The third question of study 3 asked people the following
question:
How important do you consider holidays to be for you?
Responses were recorded on a 21-point Likert scale anchored at ’-10’
meaning ’not at all important’, ’0’ meaning ’somewhat important’ and ’+10’
meaning ’very important’.
Results
The average amount of holidays that the 73 participants wanted to be
offered to decide in favor of either a career as a lawyer or a career as an
architect was 9.14 days (SD = 6.28). The mean value for those participants
assigned to the (Becoming a lawyer) question was 11.42 (SD = 6.59) and
for (Becoming an architect) was 7.03 (SD = 5.15). As regards to the im-
portance of holidays, the average value was 4.04 (SD = 5.32). In order to
test the hypothesis stated above, we carried out a simple linear regression
to predict the number of additional holidays based on people’s ratings of
the importance of holidays. The analysis yielded a Pearson’s correlation co-
efficient of r = -0.07. No significant correlation was found, F(1,69) = .29, p
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= 0.586. Due to the difference in the average rating of number of holidays
in both conditions, we conducted linear regressions for each condition. No
significant correlations were found; Becoming a lawyer : F(1,34) = 0.29, p =
0.866; Becoming an architect: F(1,33) = 0.22, p = 0.643. The data points as
well as the regression line are depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Data points relating the importance of holidays with the threshold-value of holidays.
The line indicates the correlation function between both variables.
Discussion
The results of the simple linear regression revealed no significant cor-
relation between additional holidays and perceived importance of holidays.
While we cannot conclude that no correlation exists, given the null hypothe-
sis, the data strongly suggests that people’s perception of the importance of
holidays does not predict and hence influence the number of additional holi-
days needed to choose one career over the other. Only 0.4% of the variability
in the amount of holidays could be accounted for by the importance of the
holidays. As we have outlined above, this result aligns with the predictions
of the rough comparability view and goes against the strict incomparability
account.
4 General Discussion
For the last 30 years, philosophers have discussed hard cases of comparison
in rational decision-making processes, as well as different ways of characteri-
zing these hard cases. Within these debates, it is usually assumed that hard
cases indeed exist (and as such present real-world dilemmas). Moreover, a
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large consensus has evolved, claiming that hard cases imply intransitive rea-
soning. So far, both the assumption and the consensus are merely supported
by the intuitive plausibility of exemplary cases, whereby the intuitive plau-
sibility is judged by experts in the field. Recently, however, the experimental
philosophy movement has put severe pressure on examining expert intuiti-
ons, for too often expert intuitions neither reflect the intuitions of lay people,
nor do they function as stable and robust pieces of evidence (Machery et
al. 2004, Swain et al. 2008). A similar charge can be mounted against the
discussion at hand: If lay people do not distinguish easy from hard cases,
and / or do not violate transitivity when encountering hard cases, the de-
bate becomes almost pointless – merely relevant for the reasoning processes
of the very few.
We therefore started to investigate the claims of this debate empirically.
Fortunately for the philosophical consensus – but maybe less interesting to
some – we were able to confirm the reliability and representative character of
the expert’s intuitions in regards to two central assertions: First, the results
of our experiments clearly show that a large majority of people distinguish
hard cases from easy ones and reveal response patterns that are predicted by
the philosophical consensus. Second, a substantial majority of people violate
transitivity when reasoning about hard cases. Having used two different
studies, i.e. decisions in regard to career choice and leisure time, our results
do not seem to depend on either the specific choice a person is confronted
with or the exact wording of the questions. Instead, it is likely that our
results are robust and easily replicable. While the philosophical consensus
has predicted such an outcome, some philosophers have argued against the
mainstream. Regan (1997) has not only expressed a reasonable skepticism
about the obviousness of the consensus – which we appreciate – he has also
argued that hard cases might not exist (or are at least not as widespread
as one might think). In other words, Regan has argued in favor of strong
comparability even in the examples we discussed above. However, Regan’s
position seems to be refuted by our empirical data.
Not only have we empirically investigated the philosophical consensus,
we also aimed to operationalize one of the main interpretations of the con-
clusion of the small-improvement argument and to provide empirical results
that can move this debate forward. In this process of operationalization
we had to disregard important details of many theories on hard cases of
comparison. Nonetheless, even a fairly crude operationalization is probably
better than none, even if it merely helps to distance oneself from one spe-
cific interpretation. In a nutshell, the idea was to use different predictions
that various theories would make about the nature of incentives in decision-
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making processes. Whereas strict incomparabilitists think that no incentive
will be strong enough to make the original options comparable, advocates of
rough comparability think otherwise. Our results from (3.3) support a rea-
ding of hard cases according to which two options are not incomparable in
a strict sense but actually roughly comparable. More specifically, our data
shows that the perceived importance of the incentive does not correlate with
the magnitude of the incentive. This correlation should have been observed
if strict incomparability is the case. Theories of rough equality and parity
are consistent with the fact that no such correlation was found. Thus, our
investigation favors a specific interpretation of hard cases, i.e. that two op-
tions that are neither better, nor worse, nor equally good, can nevertheless
be comparable. We do not, of course, have shown that no hard cases exist
in which two options are conceived of as truly incomparable. This study
has only investigated a single hard case. Thus, it is quite possible that hard
cases fall into two sets: those in which options are roughly equal and those
in which the options are incomparable. Where does all that leave us?
We have begun our discussion with an argument linking rational choice
with hard cases of comparison:
i. The possibility of rational choice between two options depends on them
being comparable.
ii. Two options, x and y, are comparable, if and only if x is either better
than, worse than, or equal to y.
iii. There are hard cases, in which x is neither better, nor worse, nor
equally good to y.
∴ There are hard cases, in which a rational decision cannot be made.
In this paper, we have examined the truth of premises (ii) and (iii) of the
above argument. We have provided empirical evidence in favor of premise
(iii): many people agree with all three premises of the small-improvement
argument, and hence it seems we can frame hard cases as choices in which one
option is neither better than, nor worse than, nor equally good to another
option. However, and importantly, our results also show that premise (ii)
does not seem to be the case. Although one option might be neither better,
nor worse, nor equally good to another option, people seem to compare
these options. Once an incentive is provided that exeeds a certain individual
threshold, people decide in favor of the improved option. This is not due
to the fact that the incentive becomes the center of the decision making
process, but because the area of rough equality has been ’left behind’.
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So, are people rational even in hard cases of comparison? This all depends
on which aspect of rationality is emphasized. According to the argument
above and the data we provided against premise (ii), hard choices are rational
decisions. However, we should not forget that people violate transitivity
in hard cases. Thus, if transitive reasoning is at the heart of rationality,
people do in fact show at least some form of irrationality in hard cases of
comparison. This discussion, however, would leave the purely descriptive
realm that we have intended to tackle in this paper.
5 Conclusion
Hard cases of comparison are a fascinating test bed for rational-decision
making processes that have been at the center of philosophical debates for
almost three decades. Our aim in this paper was to (a) provide an empiri-
cal foundation to advance these debate, as well as (b) investigate empirical
avenues for the operationalization of various interpretations. Our studies ha-
ve shown that the experts’ intuitions in this particular field are spot on in
highlighting the special status of hard cases and characterizing such cases
as instances in which agents violate transitivity. We have also suggested one
particular way to adjudicate between various interpretations of the small-
improvement argument. If our method is sound and our data robust, the
results put pressure on advocates of incomparability: People seem to be
capable to compare both options in at least some hard cases of comparison.
Appendix 1: The role of (in)transitivity in the small-
improvement argument
In part 2 of the paper we have claimed that the role of (in)transitivity within
the small-improvement argument is more complex, i.e. that some versions of the
argument also involve a different form of transitivity. Let us first restate the premises
of the small-improvement argument:
1 ¬(x ≻ y) ∧¬(y ≻ x) premise
2 ¬(x+ ≻ y) ∧¬(y ≻ x+) premise
3 x+ ≻ x premise
The crucial point regarding the role of transitivity within the argument is con-
tained in the inference from premises (2) and (3) from which it is concluded that
both options are not equally good. In order to validate this conclusion, additio-
nal assumptions are needed. The following formalization shows that the small-
improvement argument (SIA) requires transitivity:
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1 ¬(x+ ≻ y) premise 2 of the SIA
2 x+ ≻ x premise 3 of the SIA
3 x+ ≻ x ∧ x = y → x+ ≻ y transitivity
4 ¬(x+ ≻ x ∧ x = y) 1,3 MTT 15
C [∴] ¬(x = y) 2,4 MPT
According to the formalizations given above, the following transitivity-condition
is required as a premise in order to arrive at the conclusion:
x+ ≻ x ∧ x = y → x+ ≻ y
Espinoza, following Savage, calls this equation ’indifference principle’ (Sava-
ge 1954, p. 17, Espinoza 2008, p. 130.), while Gustafsson & Espinoza call it PI-
transitivity (Gustafsson & Espinoza 2010, p. 755). This principle of transitivity can
be interpreted either as normative assumption or as an empirical hypothesis. As a
normative assumption this principle states that if two options are valued equally,
then a small improvement on either option requires the agent to prefer the impro-
ved one. As an empirical hypothesis this principle states that if two options are
valued equally, a small improvement on either option makes the agent preferring
the improved one. Gustafssson & Espinoza (2010) therefore claim that transitivity
is one of the core premises of the small-improvement argument.
However, this claim can be challenged, since there are alternative formalizations
which do not involve transitivity. The following formalization, for instance, does not
involve transitivity:
1 ¬(x+ ≻ y) premise 2 of the SIA
2 x+ ≻ x premise 3 of the SIA
3 x = y premise
4 ¬(x+ ≻ x) 1,3 x=y
5 x+ ≻ x ∧ ¬(x+ ≻ x) 2,4 ∧I
C [∴] ¬(x = y) 3,5 reductio
Assuming first that x and y are equally good, we then deduced a contradiction
– substituting x and y in premise (1). This leads to a reductio of premise (3). The
opposite of the assumed premise must be true, i.e. x and y are not equally good.
Thus, the premises of the small-improvement argument involve intransitivity –
we have shown that in the paper –, but the conclusion of the argument, i.e. that
one option is neither better, nor worse, nor equally good to another option, may
also assume a different kind of transitivity.
15This premise is actually logically equivalent with the conclusion since ’¬(P ∧ R)’ is
logically equivalent with ’¬P ∨ ¬R’.
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Appendix 2: Vignettes of Study 1 and Study 2
Study 1: Hard case
First Vignette
Imagine you have got the choice between a successful career as a lawyer and a
successful career as an artist. How would you evaluate your situation?
• A career as a lawyer is better than a career as an artist.
• A career as a lawyer is worse than a career as an artist.
• A career as a lawyer is neither better nor worse than a career as an artist.
Second Vignette
Now imagine you have got the choice between a successful career as a lawyer
plus 2 additional holidays and a successful career as an artist. How would you
evaluate your situation?
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is better than a career as an
artist.
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is worse than a career as an
artist.
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is neither better nor worse
than a career as an artist.
Third Vignette
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between a successful career as
a lawyer plus 2 additional holidays and a successful career as a lawyer without 2
additional holidays. How would you evaluate your situation?
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is better than a career as a
lawyer.
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is worse than a career as a
lawyer.
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is neither better nor worse
than a career as a lawyer.
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Study 1: Easy case
First Vignette
Smith & Partners as well as Jones & Partners are two successful law firms in
New York. Now imagine you have got the choice between a successful career as a
lawyer at Smith & Partners and a successful career as a lawyer a Jones & Partners.
How would you evaluate your situation?
• A career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners is better than a career as a lawyer
at Jones & Partners.
• A career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners is worse than a career as a lawyer
at Jones & Partners.
• A career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners is neither better nor worse than
a career as a lawyer at Jones & Partners.
Second Vignette
Now imagine you have got the choice between a successful career as a lawyer at
Smith and Partners plus 2 additional holidays and a successful career as a lawyer
at Jones and Partners without additional holidays. How would you evaluate your
situation?
• A career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners plus additional holidays is better
than a career as a lawyer at Jones & Partners.
• A career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners plus additional holidays is worse
than a career as a lawyer at Jones & Partners.
• A career as a lawyer at Smith & Partners plus additional holidays is neither
better nor worse than a career as a lawyer at Jones & Partners.
Third Vignette Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between a suc-
cessful career as a lawyer plus 2 additional holidays and a successful career as a
lawyer without 2 additional holidays. How would you evaluate your situation?
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is better than a career as a
lawyer.
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is worse than a career as a
lawyer.
• A career as a lawyer plus additional holidays is neither better nor worse
than a career as a lawyer.
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Study 2: Hard case
First Vignette
Imagine you have got the choice between two different ways of spending your
spare time: You can either go out with friends once a week or you can do sports
once a week. How would you evaluate your situation?
• Going out with friends once a week is better than doing sports once a week.
• Going out with friends once a week is worse than doing sports once a week.
• Going out with friends once a week is neither better nor worse than doing
sports once a week.
Second Vignette
Now imagine you have got the choice between the following options. You can
either go out with friends once a week plus you get one dollar or you can do sports
once a week. How would you evaluate your situation?
• Going out with friends once a week plus an extra dollar is better than doing
sports once a week.
• Going out with friends once a week plus an extra dollar is worse than doing
sports once a week.
• Going out with friends once a week plus an extra dollar is neither better
nor worse than doing sports once a week.
Third Vignette
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between the following options: You
can either go out with friends once a week plus you get one dollar or you can go
out with friends once a week. How would you evaluate your situation?
• Going out with friends once a week plus an extra dollar is better than going
out with friends.
• Going out with friends once a week plus an extra dollar is worse than going
out with friends.
• Going out with friends once a week plus an extra dollar is neither better
nor worse than going out with friends.
Study 2: Easy case
First Vignette Orange Fitness Club as well as Yellow Fitness Club are two
great fitness clubs in New York. Now imagine you have got the choice between
two ways of spending your spare time: You can either do your weekly workout at
Orange Fitness Club or you can do your weekly workout at Yellow Fitness Club.
How would you evaluate your situation?
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• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club is better than a weekly workout
at Yellow Fitness Club.
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club is worse than a weekly workout
at Yellow Fitness Club.
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club is neither better nor worse
than a weekly workout at Yellow Fitness Club.
Second Vignette
Now imagine you have got the choice between the following options: You can
either do your weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club plus you get one dollar or
you can do your weekly workout at Yellow Fitness Club. How would you evaluate
your situation?
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club plus an extra dollar is better than
a weekly workout at Yellow Fitness Club.
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club plus an extra dollar is worse than
a weekly workout at Yellow Fitness Club.
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club plus an extra dollar is neither
better nor worse than a weekly workout at Yellow Fitness Club.
Third Vignette
Now, lastly, imagine you have got the choice between the following options: You
can either do your weekly workou at Orange Fitness Club plus you get one dollar or
you can do your weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club. How would you evaluate
your situation?
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club plus an extra dollar is better than
a weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club.
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club plus an extra dollar is worse than
a weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club.
• A weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club plus an extra dollar is neither
better nor worse than a weekly workout at Orange Fitness Club.
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